Irish philosopher George Bishop Berkeley was one of the greatest philosophers of the early modern period. Along with David Hume and John Locke he is considered one of the fathers of British Empiricism. Berkeley is a clear, concise, and sympathetic introduction to George Berkeley’s philosophy, and a thorough review of his most important texts. Daniel E. Flage explores his works on vision, metaphysics, morality, and economics in an attempt to develop a philosophically plausible interpretation of Berkeley’s oeuvre as whole. (...) Many scholars blur the rejection of material substance with the claim that only minds and things dependent upon minds exist. However Flage shows how, by distinguishing idealism from immaterialism and arguing that Berkeley’s account of what there is is dependent upon what is known, a careful and plausible philosophy emerges. The author sets out the implications of this valuable insight for Berkeley’s moral and economic works, showing how they are a natural outgrowth of his metaphysics, casting new light on the appreciation of these and other lesser-known areas of Berkeley’s thought. Daniel E. Flage’s Berkeley presents the student and general reader with a clear and eminently readable introduction to Berkeley’s works which also challenges standard interpretations of Berkeley’s philosophy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:U.S. Organizational Sentencing Guidelines provide firms with incentives to develop formal ethics programs to promote ethical organizational cultures and thereby decrease corporate offenses. Yet critics argue such programs are cosmetic. Here we studied bank employees before and after the introduction of formal ethics training—an important component of formal ethics programs—to examine the effects of training on ethical organizational culture. Two years after a single training session, we find sustained, positive effects on indicators of an ethical organizational culture (observed unethical behavior, (...) intentions to behave ethically, perceptions of organizational efficacy in managing ethics, and the firm’s normative structure). While espoused organizational values also rose in importance post-training, the boost dissipated after the second year which suggests perceptions of values are not driving sustained behavioral improvements. This finding conflicts with past theory which asserts that enduring behavioral improvements arise from the inculcation of organizational values. Implications for future research are discussed. (shrink)

We present two studies that examine the effects of guanxi on multiple social groups from the perspective of Chinese business people. Study 1 (N = 203) tests the difference in perceived effects of six guanxi contextualizations. Study 2 (N = 195) examines the duality of guanxi as either helpful or harmful to social groups, depending on the contextualization. Findings suggest guanxi may result in positive as well as negative outcomes for focal actors and the aggregate.

Recent corporate social initiatives (CSIs) have garnered criticisms from a wide range of audiences due to perceived inconsistencies. Some critics use the label “woke” when CSIs are perceived as inconsistent with the firm’s purpose. Other critics use the label “woke washing” when CSIs are perceived as inconsistent with the firm’s practices or values. I will argue that this derogatory use of woke is stigmatizing, leads to claims of hypocrisy, and can cause stakeholder backlash. I connect this process to our own (...) field by considering inconsistencies in our organizations and in our teaching that could garner similar criticisms. After describing the stigmatization process, I consider the moral implications of inconsistencies for CSIs and draw parallels to our field. I end by suggesting next steps for our field in response to the stigmatization of CSIs and to guard against the stigmatization of our own work. (shrink)

Plagiarism is increasingly evident in business and academia. Though links between demographic, personality, and situational factors have been found, previous research has not used actual plagiarism behavior as a criterion variable. Previous research on academic dishonesty has consistently used self-report measures to establish prevalence of dishonest behavior. In this study we use actual plagiarism behavior to establish its prevalence, as well as relationships between integrity-related personal selection and workplace deviance measures. This research covers new ground in two respects: (a) That (...) the academic dishonesty literature is subject to revision using criterion variables to avoid self bias and social desirability issues and (b) we establish the relationship between actual academic dishonesty and potential workplace deviance/white-collar crime. (shrink)

While e-commerce has grown rapidly in recent years, some of the practices associated with certain aspects of marketing on the Internet, such as pop-ups, cookies, and spam, have raised concerns on the part of Internet users. In this paper I examine the nature of these practices and what I take to be the underlying source of this concern. I argue that the ethical issues surrounding these Internet marketing techniques move us beyond the traditional treatment of the ethics of marketing and (...) advertising found in discussions of business ethics previously. Rather, I show that the questions they raise ultimately turn upon questions of technique and the ways in which technologies can transform the fundamental means by which relationships are established and maintained within a social environment. I then argue that the techniques of e-commerce are indeed transforming the means by which businesses relate to consumers, and that this transformation is affecting the applicability of our previous ways of demarcating the imperatives determining the limits of accessibility between consumers and businesses. Properly addressing the ethical status of the techniques of e-marketing as such necessarily moves us to consider the changes that Internet commerce are having upon the norms that govern individuals in their relations with others. (shrink)

Plagiarism is increasingly evident in business and academia. Though links between demographic, personality, and situational factors have been found, previous research has not used actual plagiarism behavior as a criterion variable. Previous research on academic dishonesty has consistently used self-report measures to establish prevalence of dishonest behavior. In this study we use actual plagiarism behavior to establish its prevalence, as well as relationships between integrity-related personal selection and workplace deviance measures. This research covers new ground in two respects: (a) That (...) the academic dishonesty literature is subject to revision using criterion variables to avoid self bias and social desirability issues and (b) we establish the relationship between actual academic dishonesty and potential workplace deviance/white-collar crime. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:While tone at the top is widely regarded as an important predictor of ethical behavior in organizations, we argue that recent research overlooks the various conflicting ethical tones present in many multi-organizational work settings. Further, we propose that the resolution processes promulgated in many firms and professional associations to reconcile this conflict reinforce the tone at the bottom or a tone at the top of the employee’s organization, and that both of these approaches can conflict with the tone at the (...) top of other important organizations such as professional and regulatory organizations. Here we adapt Integrative Social Contract Theory’s priority rules to propose a multi-tone reconciliation process which prioritizes conflicting ethical tones based upon features of the organization and the effects on society. Using three contextualizations, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the multi-tone reconciliation process over current processes. We conclude with recommendations for future research and implications for practice. (shrink)

In this new interpretation of Rousseau's political thought, Daniel E. Cullen demonstrates that the concept of freedom is fundamental to the complex unity of Rousseau's work. He shows that the pervasive tension in Rousseau's thought between freedom and order, legitimacy and reliability can be explained as an effort to attune the political to the natural condition and to reestablish a condition of independence in political and social circumstances. Cullen's argument bears important implications for those who currently seek to bolster (...) the case for participatory democracy by appealing to Rousseauian assumptions and conclusions. Cullen's aim is to clarify some of the issues that divide liberals from communitarians and constitutionalists from participatory democrats in the current debate about freedom, rights, morality, and politics in America. In affirming Rousseau's fundamental philosophical agreement with liberals concerning human nature and with conservatives concerning the character of a good society, Cullen suggests that Rousseau has offered perhaps the only possible theoretical resolution of the tension implicit in democratic freedom. In light of what Rousseau calls for in order to bring about this resolution, however, Cullen wonders whether the time has come to rethink fundamental questions about human nature and citizenship that underlie contemporary problems of political theory. Freedom in Rousseau's Political Philosophy will be of interest to scholars and students of the history of political thought and contemporary democratic theory. (shrink)

Research on the normative aspect of leadership is still a relatively new enterprise within the mainstream of leadership studies. In the past, most academic inquiry into leadership was grounded in a social scientific paradigm that largely ignored the ethical substance of leadership. However, perhaps because of a number of public and infamous cases of failure in business leadership, in recent years there has been renewed interest in the ethical side of leadership in business. This paper argues that ethical issues of (...) leadership actually arise at number of different levels, and that it is important to distinguish between various diverse kinds of ethical issues that arise in the study of leadership. The three levels identified are the level of the individual morality of leaders, the level of the means of their leadership, and the level of the leadership mission itself. We argue that only by fully understanding all of the different levels of ethical analysis pertinent to business leadership, and the distinctive kind of issues that arise at each level, can we fully integrate normative studies of leadership into the field of leadership studies. As such, this paper offers a model that incorporates three different levels of ethical analysis that can be used to study normative issues in leadership studies. Such a model can be used to better understand and integrate ethical issues into research, teaching, and training in leadership. (shrink)

Naïve realism is the view according to which perception is a non-representational relation of conscious awareness to mind-independent objects and properties. According to this approach, the phenomenal character of experience is constituted by just the objects, properties, or facts presented to the senses. In this article, I argue that such a conception of the phenomenology of experience faces a clear counter-example, i.e., the experience of seeing aspects. The discussion suggests that, to accommodating such a kind of experience, it must be (...) acknowledged that perception is, at least in part, representational. (shrink)

Alisdair MacIntyre argues that the virtues necessary for good work are everywhere and always embodied by particular communities of practice. As a general surgeon, MacIntyre’s work has deeply influenced my own understanding of the practice of good surgery. The task of this essay is to describe how the guild of surgeons functions as a more-or-less coherent tradition of moral enquiry, embodying and transmitting the virtues necessary for the practice of good surgery. Beginning with an example of surgeons engaged in a (...) process of moral discernment, I describe how the practice of surgery depends on the cultivation of a certain kind of practical wisdom (phronesis) that effectively orders the techniques of surgery toward particular notions of human flourishing within the limits of what is possible with the particular body on which the surgeon operates. I then argue that one reason why surgeons train in an apprenticeship model of "residency" is to cultivate not only the technical skill but also the practical wisdom to perform good surgery. I conclude by noting that the surgical profession is enduring necessary, but unprecedented, changes in the way it practices and transmits its art; and without deliberate and sustained attention to the character formation of surgeons, the profession runs the risk of creating excellent technicians who are nonetheless ill-equipped to practice wise and good surgery. (shrink)

Rankings of countries by perceived corruption have emerged over the past decade as leading indicators of governance and development. Designed to highlight countries that are known to be corrupt, their objective is to encourage transparency and good governance. High rankings on corruption, it is argued, will serve as a strong incentive for reform. The practice of ranking and labeling countries "corrupt," however, may have a perverse effect. Consistent with Social Labeling Theory, we argue that perceptual indices can encourage the loss (...) of needed investment and, thus, contribute to higher rates of corruption within unfavorably ranked countries. In effect, corruption indices may inhibit foreign direct investment, the effect of which is to encourage the status quo in terms of corruption ranking. Using an experimental study design, we test the effects of country corruption rankings on the assessment of country investment desirability and find ranking exposure causes shifts in country investment desirability for 10 of 12 countries studied. These findings suggest that corruption rankings, which are based on perceptions of corruption, may cause country isolation and a reduction in legitimate means of investment. (shrink)

I apply stigma-management strategies to corporate scandals and expand on past research by (a) describing a particular type ofstigma management strategy that involves accepting responsibility while denying it, (b) delineating types of stigma that occur in scandals (demographic versus character), and (c) considering the moral implications of shifting stigmas that arise from scandals. By emphasizing the distinction between character and demographic stigma, I make progress in evaluating the moral implications of shifting different types of stigma.

There is much discourse and focus on the social determinants of health, but undergirding these multiple intersecting and interacting determinants are legal and political determinants that have operated at every level and impact the entire life continuum. The United States has long grappled with advancing health equity via public law and policy. Seventy years after the country was founded, lawmakers finally succeeded in passing the first comprehensive and inclusive law aimed at tackling the social determinants of health, but that effort (...) was short-lived. Today the United States is faced with another fork in the road relative to the advancement of health equity. This article draws on lessons from history and law to argue that researchers, providers, payers, lawmakers and the legal community have a moral, economic and national security imperative to address not only the negative outcomes of health disparities, but also the imbalance of inputs resulting from laws and policies which fail to employ an equity lens. (shrink)

This essay responds to Hasnas’s recent article “The Normative Theories of Business Ethics: A Guide for the Perplexed” in Business Ethics Quarterly. Hasnas claims that the stockholder theory is more plausible than commonly supposed and that the stakeholder theory is prone to significant difficulties. I argue that Hasnas’s reasons for favoring the stockholder over the stakeholder theory are not asstrong as he suggests. Following Hasnas, I examine both theories in light of two sets of normative considerations: utilitarian anddeontological. First, I (...) show that utilitarian considerations clearly favor the stakeholder theory. I then argue that though Hasnas rightly accents the basic deontological constraint at the core of the stockholder theory, he is wrong to think that acknowledging such a constraint necessarily counts against the stakeholder theory. Here, I develop Ross’s notion of prima facie obligations to show how a viable stakeholder theory might be developed within a deontological framework. (shrink)

It is often assumed that engaging in a one‐on‐one dialogue with a tutor is more effective than listening to a lecture or reading a text. Although earlier experiments have not always supported this hypothesis, this may be due in part to allowing the tutors to cover different content than the noninteractive instruction. In 7 experiments, we tested the interaction hypothesis under the constraint that (a) all students covered the same content during instruction, (b) the task domain was qualitative physics, (c) (...) the instruction was in natural language as opposed to mathematical or other formal languages, and (d) the instruction conformed with a widely observed pattern in human tutoring: Graesser, Person, and Magliano's 5‐step frame. In the experiments, we compared 2 kinds of human tutoring (spoken and computer mediated) with 2 kinds of natural‐language‐based computer tutoring (Why2‐Atlas and Why2‐AutoTutor) and 3 control conditions that involved studying texts. The results depended on whether the students' preparation matched the content of the instruction. When novices (students who had not taken college physics) studied content that was written for intermediates (students who had taken college physics), then tutorial dialogue was reliably more beneficial than less interactive instruction, with large effect sizes. When novices studied material written for novices or intermediates studied material written for intermediates, then tutorial dialogue was not reliably more effective than the text‐based control conditions. (shrink)

In Freedom vs. Intervention, Daniel E. Lee addresses questions around such controversial issues as abortion, legalization of physician-assisted suicide and recreational use of marijuana, and the right to refuse medical treatment, taking an innovative approach by applying traditional just war criteria to questions of intervention.

How do English‐speaking children inflect nouns for plurality and verbs for the past tense? We assess theoretical answers to this question by considering errors of omission, which occur when children produce a stem in place of its inflected counterpart (e.g., saying “dress” to refer to 5 dresses). A total of 307 children (aged 3;11–9;9) participated in 3 inflection studies. In Study 1, we show that errors of omission occur until the age of 7 and are more likely with both sibilant (...) regular nouns (e.g., dress) and irregular nouns (e.g., man) than regular nouns (e.g., dog). Sibilant nouns are more likely to be inflected if they are high frequency. In Studies 2 and 3, we show that similar effects apply to the inflection of verbs and that there is an advantage for “regular‐like” irregulars whose inflected form, but not stem form, ends in d/t. The results imply that (a) stems and inflected forms compete for production and (b) children generalize both product‐oriented and source‐oriented schemas when learning about inflectional morphology. (shrink)

We explore an application of homological algebra to set theoretic objects by developing a cohomology theory for Hausdorff gaps. This leads to a natural equivalence notion for gaps about which we answer questions by constructing many simultaneous gaps. The first result is proved in ZFC while new combinatorial hypotheses generalizing ♣ are introduced to prove the second result. The cohomology theory is introduced with enough generality to be applicable to other questions in set theory. Additionally, the notion of an incollapsible (...) gap is introduced and the existence of such a gap is shown to be independent of ZFC. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On Friedman's Look Daniel E. Flage In a pair of articles and a book (Flage 1985a, 1985b, 1990), I argued that Hume's ideas of memory are relative ideas. In "Another Look at Flage's Hume" (this volume), Lesley Friedman challenges my account on four points. She argues (1) that it is possible to remember simple ideas in their simplicity; (2) that I have misrepresented Humean impressions ofreflection; (3) that (...) I have overlooked the importance of force and vivacity in Hume's account ofmemory; and (4) that there is no textual evidence for claiming that Humean ideas of memory are relative ideas. In addition, she contends that my interpretation cannot account for mis-remembering. In this paper I show that some of the problems Friedman finds with myinterpretation arise from myreading of Lockean distinctions into the Treatise while others stem from my conflation of distinctions drawn in the first Enquiry with comparable distinctions in the Treatise. 1. Remembering simple ideas My argument that Humean ideas ofmemory are relative ideas is based primarily on Hume's remarks in three passages. In Treatise 1.1.3, one finds this: "the imagination is not restrain'd to the same order and form with the original impressions; while the memory is in a manner tytt down in that respect, without any power of variation."1 Later in the same passage one finds this: Tis evident, that the memory preserves the original form, in which its objects were presented, and that where-ever we depart from it in recollecting any thing, it proceeds from some defect or imperfection in that faculty.... The chiefexercise of memory is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and position. (T 9) And in Treatise 1.3.5, one finds this: These faculties [memory and imagination] are as little distinguish'd from each other by the arrangement of their complexideas. For tho'itbe apeculiar propertyofthe memory to preserve the original order and position of its ideas, while the imagination transposes and changes them, as it pleases; yet this difference is not sufficient to distinguish them in their Volume XLX Number 1 187 DANIEL E. FLAGE operation, or make us know the one from the other; it being impossible to recai the past impressions, in order to compare them with our present ideas, and see whether their arrangement be exactly similar. (T 85) This is only one characteristic ofideas ofmemory, the other being the greater degree of"force andvivacity" in an idea ofthe memory vis-à-vis an idea ofthe imagination (T 9, 85). I call this characteristic the formal criterion (Flage 1985a, 171); Friedman calls it the external difference (p. 178). These passages show that ideas of the memory represent earlier impressions, or ideas, or "events," or things known.2 How do they do so? Given the remarks on the preservation of"order and form" and "order and position," and given that resemblance alone is not sufficient to distinguish nonmnemonic ideas from mnemonic ideas (see T 9), I argued that there is an implicit causal thesis: an idea ofmemory singles out the impression that was its original cause. It is a relative idea corresponding to a definite description ofthe form, "the impression that is the (original) cause of and exactly (or closely) resembles m," where 'm' denotes a particular positive idea. (Flage 1985a, 172)3 If my account of memory is correct, there is a positive idea ("mental image") that provides the basis for every relative idea of memory. Further, this positive idea must be complex. Friedman objects (pp. 180-81) that insofar as my account requires that there be a complex positive idea that provides the basis for one's relative idea of memory, this conflicts with several passages in the Treatise. She cites the ink spot experiment (T 42) as showing that one can have a simple impression of colour. She remarks, "Since we can have such a simple impression, we can also remember it" (p. 180), adding, "It seems clear that Hume thinks that in the [ink spot] experiment, all that is present in one's visual field is the spot of ink" (ibid.). Since I had argued that "Hume's example ofseeing a minimum... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Hobbism and His Anti-Hobbism Daniel E. Flage Thomas Hobbes posed a crise morale to which British philosophers attempted to reply for over a century.1 Hobbes maintained that the terms 'good' and 'evil' have no import beyond individual self-interest and the fulfilment or failure to fulfil one's desires.2 While alluding to lawsofnature knownbyreason,3whetherone deems suchlaws dictates ofprudence4 or laws of some moral import,5 Hobbes held: (1) that the (...) notion ofjustice arises only after the institution of a commonwealth, and (2) that the dictates of justice are merely the dictates of the sovereign.6 Hence, justice is strictly a matter ofconvention. In this paper I argue that the Hume ofthe Treatise was a mitigated Hobbist.7 Like Hobbes, Hume held that the notions of justice and obligation reston a setofconventional social rules. Hume distinguished himselffrom Hobbes primarily with respecttoquestions ofmoral value, and though he provided an account of moral obligation, this was secondary to his considerations of moral value. To establish this, I briefly examine the 'is'-'ought' paragraph before turning to Hume's discussions of obligation and value. 1. 'Is' and Ought' To understand the 'is'-'ought' paragraph, one must consider it in the context of Treatise 3.1.1. There Hume examines the source of one's knowledge ofmoral value, namely, "Whether 'tis by means ofour ideas or impressions we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue, and pronounce an action blameable or praise-worthy?"s Hume's discussion, however, moves rather freely between considerations ofmoral value ('good' and 'evil', 'virtue' and Vice') and considerations of moral obligation Cright' and'wrong"). Evenin the 'is'-'ought'paragraph, a paragraph that seems to be concerned with purported relations between questions offact and questions ofmoral obligation, Hume explicitly alludes to value claims at the end of the paragraph (T 470). Since a moral philosopher might make any one of three claims regarding the relations between value and obligation, namely, (a) value claims are primary and obligation claims are dependent on them;9 (b) obligation claims are primary and value claims are dependent upon them;10 or (c) there are independent grounds for claims of value and obligation, I argue that Hume was attempting to dispel position (b). If this is correct, then Hume's Volume XVIII Number 2 369 DANIEL E. FLAGE arguments both pave the way for a conventionalist theory ofobligation and undercut Hobbes's rationalistic account ofnatural law.11 Hume's discussion in Treatise 1.1.1 is a critique of moral rationalism. It consists of two types of arguments. First, there is an argument from motivation that since moral qualities influence the passions, but whatis known by reason does notinfluence the passions, moral qualities are not known by reason (T 458-63). Second, there is a series of arguments to show that moral qualities cannot be known by reason. In examining some ofthe latter discussions, we shall see how in rejecting a rationalistic ground for moral obligation, Hume also undercuts any rationalistic ground for claims ofmoral value.12 Remember, Hume's question was "Whether 'tis by means of our ideas or impressions we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue, and pronounce an action blameable or praise-worthy?" (T 456). The rationalists answered this question in terms ofideas, claiming, that there are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, which are the same to every rational being that considers them; thattheimmutable measures ofrightand wrongimpose an obligation, not only on human creatures, but also on the Deity himself: All these systems concur in the opinion, that moraUty, like truth, is discern'd merely by ideas, and by their juxta-position and comparison. (T 456-57) In this, his initial account ofthe rationalists' position, Hume seems to focus on moral obligation, rather than moral value: the alleged eternal fitnesses seem to be moral rules such as, "All cases ofwilful murder are wrong," rather than rules such as, "All cases of wilful murder are vicious (evil)." If it were possible to establish that a rule of moral obUgation is true, a moralist might accept an additional putatively self-evident bridge-principle that, "Any action that is right (wrong) is virtuous (vicious)," and thereby deduce a claim of moral value... (shrink)

Symbolic healing, that is, responding to meaningful experiences in positive ways, can facilitate human healing. This process partly engages consciousness and partly evades consciousness completely (sometimes it partakes of both simultaneously). This paper, presented as the Society for the Anthropology of Consciousness Distinguished Lecture at the 2011 AAA meeting in Montreal, reviews recent research on what is ordinarily (and unfortunately) called the “placebo effect.” The author makes the argument that language use should change, and the relevant portions of what is (...) often called the placebo effect should be referred to as the “meaning response.”. (shrink)

In the Third Meditation, Descartes suggests that God, and only God, is self-caused. This claim results in objections, first from Caterus and then from Arnauld, that an efficient cause must be distinct from its effect, and therefore the notion of self-causation is unintelligible. In the course of his reply to Arnauld, Descartes distinguishes between a formal cause and an efficient cause, contends that God's essence is properly the formal cause of God's existence, and attempts to find a cause midway between (...) a formal cause and an efficient cause. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Organizations adopt formal sanctioning systems to deter ethical violations, but the formal systems’ effectiveness may be undermined by informal sanctioning systems which promote violations. I conducted an ethnographic study of six trading crowds on two financial exchanges to understand how informal and formal sanctioning systems, which are grounded in different interpretations of equity, interact to affect trader deviance from rules established by the financial exchange (exchange deviance). To deter informal trader norms that conflict with exchange rules, the exchanges formally prohibit (...) traders’ informal sanctions. The exchanges, however, underestimate traders’ informal sanctions related to ostracism and social rejection, which are not only difficult for the exchanges to detect, but also interpersonally hurtful and harmful to trader performance. Consequently, the traders’ informal social sanctions lead to secondary sanctions from trading firms. Ultimately, the informal sanctioning system evades the formal sanctioning system by exploiting what the exchanges deem to be minor rule violations. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:173. PERCHANCE TO DREAM: A REPLY TO TRAIGER1 In "Hume on Memory and Causation" I argued that Hume took ideas of the memory to be relative ideas corresponding to definite descriptions of the general form "the complex impression that is the (original) cause of a particular positive idea m and which exactly (or closely) resembles m, " where 'm' is a variable ranging over positive ideas (mental images). My (...) argument was based primarily upon what I called Hume's formal criterion, i.e., Hume's contention that, unlike the imagination, memory preserves "the same order and form with the original impressions" (T9), it preserves "the original order and position of its ideas" (T85). Saul Traiger has recently taken exception to my interpretation of Hume, suggesting that my interpretation suffers from at least four defects. First, Traiger maintains that there is evidence that Hume took some ideas of the memory to be simple, while my account requires that they are all complex. Secondly, he maintains that my interpretation will not allow Hume to remember dreams or the contents of his imaginings, and Traiger contends that this provides at least prima facie evidence against my interpretation. Thirdly, he maintains that my account of the formal criterion is not sufficient to distinguish ideas of the memory from ideas of the imagination. Finally, he raises several questions regarding the temporal reference of ideas of the memory. I do not believe that any of Traiger's points require a significant modification of my account. I shall begin by discussing his third and fourth points and then focus 2 on his first and second points. 1. Memories and fictions. Traiger suggests that if my account of the formal criterion is correct, the formal criterion is not sufficient to distinguish 174, ideas of the memory from ideas of the imagination, "because there are complex ideas which are caused by resembling complex impressions but which are not memories" (FHAM, p. 170). He illustrates this by appealing to a writer of fiction who might appeal to some of his memories in constructing his fictitious world. Why, then, would not the resulting ideas of fiction count as ideas of the memory, since they meet both the causal conditions and the order and position requirements? The answer is that in the case of an idea of fiction one does not conceive of one's positive idea as a representative of some other perception. It is only because one conceives of the positive idea of which one is aware in memory as a representative of some other particular perception or perceptions that questions of form and order come into play. 2. Temporal reference. At several places in his paper, Traiger raises questions concerning the temporal reference of ideas of the memory. He suggests, first, that Hume's concern with "order" was with temporal order, rather than the order and arrangement of simple ideas in the complex positive component of an idea of the memory (FHAM, p. 168), and, secondly, that "when we remember, we place an impression in its temporal context, its place among a temporal sequence of perceptions" and this "temporal reference is generally not secured by the causal and resemblance relations an idea bears to an antecedent impression" (FHAM, p. 171). Regarding the first of these claims, it is clear that an idea of the memory can be "true" only if it represents a past impression or event, and since Hume construed representation in terms of resemblance (T233), this indicates that at least part of his concern with "order" must be with the arrangement of simple ideas in the complex positive component of an idea of the memory. Were it not for 175. such a correspondence between the "order" of simple ideas in the positive component of one's relative idea of the memory and the "order" of the simple impressions in the original impression, one's idea of the memory could not represent the original impression. Resemblance, however, plays no role in determining what the temporal position of the original impression was, and this brings us to Traiger's second point. Since Hume's account of time would seem to require that one locate a past impression within a series... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:158. RELATIVE IDEAS REVISITED: A REPLY TO THOMAS In "Hume's Relative Ideas" I argued that what Hume called a "relative idea" is the cognitive analogue of a definite description, that relative ideas are nonimagistic, and that recognizing the distinction between positive ideas (images) and relative ideas sheds light on various issues that remain opaque apart from that distinction. Thomas has recently taken exception to my position, contending that I (...) have "produced a 2 theory without application in Hume's framework." In reply I shall present the three cornerstones of my view and then turn to Thomas's criticisms. I. On Relative Ideas 1.What relative ideas are: In claiming that a relative idea is the cognitive analogue of a definite description, I mean only that a relative idea functions in the cognitive realm (realm of ideas) in the same way that a definite description functions in the linguistic realm. Just as the statement expressing the contextual definition of a definite description specifies the truth conditions for a statement containing that description, the statement expressing the contextual definition of a definite description corresponding to a relative idea indicates the (factual) conditions that must obtain if that relative idea succeeds in singling out an entity, i.e., it specifies the "truth conditions" for a relative idea (see T 448, T 458, and T 84 for Hume's use of 'truth'). 2.The intellectual milieu: The expressions 'relative idea' and 'relative notion' seem to have at least two uses in eighteenth century philosophy. Some philosophers used such expressions to refer to an idea 4 or a conception of a relation. Nonetheless, since no 159. substance theorist held that a substance is a relation, this can hardly be the sense in which Locke used the expression when he claimed that one has an "obscure and relative idea of substance in general." Further, Locke's discussion of the relationship between positive ideas (images) and the relative idea of substance clearly indicates that relative ideas provide an indirect means of allowing one to know what something is on the basis of its relation to something known directly, i.e., on the basis of its relation to a C positive idea. Locke also claimed that one's idea of 7 infinity is a relative idea, he seems to have held that the idea of power is a relative idea, and given his account of perception, it is at least reasonable to suggest that relative ideas are found in perceptual contexts. Similarly, Berkeley maintained that one has a relative notion of immaterial substance, but no relative notion of material substance, since in the former case, but not in the latter, one has a notion 9 of the relation between: a substance and its attributes. Outside the "way of ideas" one finds the distinction between direct and relative "conception" clearly spelled out in Reid' s Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind. Reid wrote: Of some things, we know what they are in themselves; our conception of such things I call direct. Of other things, we do not know what they are in themselves, but only that they have certain properties or attributes, or certain relations to other things; of these our conception is only relative. 10 Reid contended that our conceptions of mind, of body, of powers, and of secondary qualities are relative conceptions, that at least some of our conceptions of large numbers of things and of polygons are relative conceptions, and that relative conceptions are operative in memory. Now given that there seems to have been a fairly 160. widely recognized doctrine of relative conception in the eighteenth century, given that the contexts in which Hume used the term 'relative idea' are contexts in which proponents of relative conception employed that term, and given that Hume stated philosophical issues in terms of the conceptual system of his time, I consider it reasonable to suggest that Hume recognized and held a doctrine of relative conception even though he did not devote so much as a paragraph to stating that doctrine. 3. The relation of images to relative ideas: A relative idea is inherently complex: it includes a positive idea (or ideas) and a relation... (shrink)

This new annotated translation of Chapter Six of Hegel's _Phenomenology of Spirit_, the joint product of a group of scholars that included H. S. Harris, George di Giovanni, John W. Burbidge, and Kenneth Schmitz, represents an advance in accuracy and fluency on previous translations into English of this core chapter of the Phenomenology. Its notes and commentary offer both novice and scholar more guidance to this text than is available in any other translation, and it is thus well suited for (...) use in survey courses. (shrink)